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Jonathan Glover believes that philosophical questioning can play a role in helping people live 
better lives. Many of us lead lives that are less good than they could be because we have 
belief systems that are implausible, or overly rigid, or because we are unsure of our values, or 
need to revise them. Socratic questioning can play a role in enabling people to come to see 
that their current views or way of life might need changing. Thus, by questioning, a 
fundamentalist Christian may come to reassess their belief that only those who have accepted 
Jesus as their savior will be saved (“Is it really plausible that God would condemn those who 
happened never to hear the gospel?”), and a workaholic may reassess their implicit valuing of 
work above all things (“Would you want this sort of life for your children?”). The idea that 
the world can be made better through conversations that lead individuals to question and 
reassess their worldviews is a general theme in much of Glover’s work. Alien Landscapes? is 
an extremely rich book that develops many ideas; one is the idea that Socratic questioning 
might play a role in better understanding and treating mental disorder. 
 
There are at least three different ways in which Glover thinks Socratic questioning might play 
a role in psychiatry: 
 
1.Questioning to clarify problems 
 
The first chapters of Alien Landscapes? describe interviews that Glover conducted with 
people diagnosed with Antisocial Personality Disorder held at Broadmoor Hospital (a high-
security psychiatric hospital). Glover is interested in clarifying what might be meant by the 
claim that people with ASPD lack a conscience.  Is it that they are incapable of empathy (they 
don’t know they cause other’s pain)? Or is it a problem with sympathy (they know they cause  
pain, but don’t care). Or that they feel no guilt? Or that they don’t understand moral concepts, 
or something else? Glover seeks to use Socratic questioning to explore the value systems of 
people with ASPD; for example he asks his interviewees what they would do if made 
invisible by the ring of Gyges.  The resulting interviews are extremely interesting and 
demonstrate how Socratic questioning can enable a more nuanced mapping of an individual’s 
value-system. Glover is surely right that such questioning can facilitate a better understanding 
of what might have gone wrong in cases of personality disorder, and potentially offer some 
clues as to how such conditions might be treated. 
 
2. Questioning to treat symptoms 
 
Glover believes that Socratic questioning might also be used as a form of therapy. He 
discusses a soldier whose task was to shoot down aircraft attacking his warship. At the crucial 
moment, a technical fault meant that his rapier missile did not fire. As a consequence, bombs 
landed on the warship, killing many. The soldier was in no way responsible, but felt 
profoundly guilty and suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. In considering how such 
a man might be helped, Glover suggests that he might benefit from being asked certain 
questions.  Glover notes that train drivers often feel guilt when a train, which could not 
possibly stop in time, kills someone. The soldier might be asked to consider such cases and 
asked how his case compares. “Do you blame the driver of the train that kills the person who 
jumps into its path?” “Should he go on feeling bad about what happened if it is possible to 
stop doing so?” “Are you really so different from the train driver?” (p325). As another 
example, Glover considers how Socratic questioning might help those with anorexia who 
adopt a value system that revolves around control and food. Noting that it is easy to see other 
people’s “mind-forged manacles”, he suggests that a therapist might describe someone else 
who ruins their life via the adoption of an overly narrow value system, for example a 
religious fundamentalist who sees nothing in the everyday world but sin and temptation, and 
ask “How is your way of seeing things less stifling..?” (p353). The basic idea seems to be that 
psychiatric symptoms can be dependent on systems of belief or value that need challenging.  
 
3. Questioning to reconstruct lives  
  
Finally, Glover thinks that Socratic questioning might be employed to help those whose lives 
have been damaged by mental illness and who are now faced with the task of self-
reconstruction. He considers the writings of Simon Champ, who suffered from schizophrenia 
for many years. Once Champ’s symptoms were controlled by medication, he still needed to 
reconstruct his sense of identity and autonomy. Champ managed to do this himself, via a 
process of self-directed reflection. This involved, for example, revising his sense of identity, 
which has previously been linked to ideas of paid employment, so that he could think of 
himself as making other contributions. Glover notes that Champ’s self-directed project 
required unusual powers of self-reflection and thinks that others might need help to 
reconstruct a sense of identity and autonomy. This might involve a “long recurring Socratic 
conversation that goes deep inside the person” (p387). 
 
 
What exactly is Socratic questioning supposed to be? And how is it supposed to work? When 
talking of Socratic questioning Glover has in mind something like the discussions that go on 
in a philosophy seminar. The process works 
 
By asking people what they think…pressing them to state their views with 
maximum clarify and explicitness. Then they are challenged to defend their 
beliefs in the face of counterexamples and opposing argument. The student is 
pushed into a journey of self-exploration, rather than being given “the answers” 
by the teacher.” (p.9) 
 
Glover believes that such questioning can have a transformative impact on people’s lives. His 
evidence for this claim is that through his teaching he has seen cases where students come to 
radically reassess their worldviews (Glover, 2008). 
 
Glover’s seminars sound wonderful. My initial concern when reading Glover’s description 
was that his ideas about the transformative power of philosophical discussion failed to mesh 
with my own experiences of teaching. Glover’s students may be engaged in self-exploration; 
re-evaluating their basic values and beliefs. Mine mainly rehearse fairly standard arguments 
in the hope of being able write a 2:1 essay. On reflection, however, I think this concern can be 
overcome. Too often university students and academic philosophers fail to be deeply 
challenged by Socratic questioning because they are not sincerely interested in working out 
what to think, but rather employ the method for instrumental ends. They aim to construct an 
argument that is good enough; to get a 2:1, or to get a paper published.  To my shame (in the 
light of reading Glover’s book) I have often supported such thinking in the advice I have 
given to students; I have, for example, told students writing essays that they need a firm 
conclusion and arguments for it, but that they shouldn’t worry too much whether they 
actually believe the opinions that they express.  If used as a form of therapy, however, the 
worry that academic philosophy might be better characterized as a form of academic game 
rather than as a journey of self-discovery and construction might be overcome. Those 
mentally disordered people who seek therapy are generally unhappy with the way their lives 
are currently going. In such a situation those utilizing Socratic questioning may be hoped to 
be willing to sincerely re-evaluate their current beliefs and values. It is worth noting too that 
Glover’s Socratic questioning would differ from the types of questioning that go on in 
philosophy seminars in further important respects - that might help move it away from the 
point-scoring enterprise that characterizes much academic philosophy. In contrast to the 
aggressive forms of questioning that go on in some seminars, Glover’s Socratic questioning is 
supposed to be “gentle” and to involve “sympathetic questioning” (p.340). The questioning is 
supposed to go on for a long time. The aim is to help people to sincerely re-evaluate their 
existing worldview, rather than to produce an answer that is defensible for some strategic 
purpose. 
 
There is much that is attractive about Glover’s idea that Socratic questioning can help people 
to re-evaluate their beliefs and values in ways that enable their lives to go better. The basic 
idea seems plausible, and the application of Socratic questioning as a form of therapy is 
politically and morally attractive in so far as it pushes against the tendency to see mentally 
disordered people as other or alien. The use of Socratic questioning as a form of therapy 
assumes that people with many mental disorders are roughly rational. This assumption should 
often be accepted, both because it is frequently true, and also because acting on the 
assumption that mentally disordered people can be rational can go some way towards shoring 
up or constructing that rationality. Most of us need to engage in rational discussion with 
others in order to construct sensible worldviews; people with mental disorders will need 
social support in developing systems of belief and value at least as much as do the rest of us. 
 
I’m persuaded by the general idea that a program of Socratic questioning might help many of 
us, including many mentally disordered people, to come to lives better lives. However, I’d 
like to push Glover on two issues: 
 First, is there any way of providing courses of transformative Socratic questioning cheaply? 
The potential expense of possible forms of therapy is a hugely important question in 
determining their viability. Mental disorders are prevalent, and expensive therapies cannot be 
utilized on a mass scale. My worry that Socratic questioning as therapy might be very 
expensive arise as, in Glover’s descriptions, transformative Socratic questioning comes 
across as something that requires a skilled questioner. I can imagine that a series of 
conversations with Glover might help me to lead a better life. But Glover is a great 
philosopher. When thinking of the sorts of question that might help an individual suffering 
from some mental disorder he can draw on a wealth of knowledge, and has a fine eye for the 
apt comparison (an anorexic might be like Jeanette Winterson’s mother, a soldier with PTSD 
might feel guilt like a train driver). I worry that developing the expertise to conduct Socratic 
questioning is quite hard. What’s more, suitable therapists for conducting Socratic 
questioning need not only to be clever, but also to be morally good (as they will work in a 
position of power with vulnerable people). Here lies the nub of the problem. Both clever 
people and good people are in short supply, and those who are both clever and good are even 
scarcer – their time will be expensive, and Socratic questioning of the transformative type 
will frequently take a lot of time. In this regard, I worry that Socratic questioning as therapy 
looks too like traditional psychoanalysis – it might well work, but it requires a long-term 
individualized program administered by an expert, and is thus too expensive to be of any 
practical use.  
 
I suspect that economically viable treatments for mental disorder will need to be “black-box” 
therapies. A black-box therapy would be a form of what Donald Mackenzie (1993) terms 
“black-box technology”. Black-box technologies are so named because they are typically sold 
in black boxes. Black-box technologies may originally have been hard to develop, but have 
now been perfected so that they can be produced on an industrial scale.  An unskilled user 
can now buy them off-the-shelf and get them to work. Lasers offer an example. When it 
comes to forms of therapy, successful drug therapies provide the clearest example of black-
box therapies. Developing drugs is of course difficult, but once the right chemical has been 
found they can ideally be produced on a mass scale and taken with reliable effect by people 
with little understanding of how they work. Paracetamol, or the contraceptive pill, would be 
examples. 
 
I think it will only be possible to develop black-box therapies for mental disorders if cases of 
disorders can be thought of as falling into kinds, as opposed to being unique to each 
individual (Cooper, 2013). Mass produced therapies are developed to work on the assumption 
that in the relevant respects the problems of those in the treatment group are all 
fundamentally the same. Note that although drug therapies offer the clearest promise of 
black-boxability, other forms of therapy might also be black-boxable. Manualized forms of 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy offer examples; these enable relatively unskilled therapists to 
administer programs of therapy based on a manual. Alternatively, in some cases self-help 
books or online courses might be designed so that individuals with a certain kind of problem 
(compulsive hoarding, say) can self-administer forms of therapy by working through 
exercises.   
 
My first question for Glover is whether it would be possible to manualize Socratic 
questioning? Could a book or computer-program be designed to enable someone to work 
through the rights sorts of questions to re-evaluate their worldview? Or, if transformative 
Socratic questioning requires conservations with an actual person who asks individually 
tailored questions, how skilled does the questioner need to be? Tied with this question I’d like 
to know how Glover’s envisaged Socratic therapy compares with the type of questioning that 
some Cognitive Therapists already use. Texts in cognitive therapy describe the use of a 
method known as “Socratic questioning” or “guided discovery” which seeks to use questions 
to enable a client to reflect on what they already know and to use it to self-discover solutions 
to their problems (for overviews see Overholser 2010, Padesky 1993). The method described 
within the cognitive therapy literature comes across as less individualized, and as requiring a 
less-skilled interviewer, than does Glover’s. For example, Padesky (1993) offers novices a 
list of “good Socratic questions that a therapist might ask almost any client”, which include 
the following: “Have you ever been in similar circumstances before?, What did you do?, How 
did that turn out?,  What do you know now that you didn’t know then? What would you 
advise a friend who told you something similar?” (p.1). Does Glover think that an interviewer 
trained to ask such questions (or a self-help book that posed them to readers) might be 
enough to provide transformative Socratic therapy? 
 
My second question for Glover is whether he is too quick to assume that helping individuals 
to develop systems of belief and value that better fit epistemic norms (coherence, plausibility, 
etc) will help them to lead more flourishing lives. In his discussion of cases where Socratic 
questioning might help someone to lead a better life I worry that Glover picks the easy cases. 
Glover discusses the soldier with PTSD who suffers from unjustified guilt. Seeing that he 
was not responsible might help him. But what of the soldier who has done terrible things and 
is culpable? Suppose that the truth is that he’s cruel, selfish, cowardly and that the world 
would be better off without him. Is that the sort of truth that someone might come to live 
with? I guess the hope would be that an individual who comes to believe himself vicious 
would decide to set about changing his actions and character. But suppose I have good reason 
to think that I will not be able to become a better person; either because a history of failed 
attempts makes it inductively plausible that I will continue to do evil things, or because my 
problems with impulse control, say, stem from brain damage. Or, consider a different sort of 
case where the link between truth and human flourishing looks shaky, where a vulnerable 
individual manages to refashion a livable life through believing falsehoods. Suppose a 
mother’s child dies horribly, and her life is destroyed by grief.  She goes to see a spiritualist, 
who claims to communicate with the dead child who reports being much happier living as an 
angel. The mother finds some peace, but, we suppose, the beliefs on which this peace is based 
are epistemically poorly grounded. What would be the role of the Socratic questioner here? 
Should false but comforting beliefs sometimes be left well alone?  
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